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CoLIATERAL DAMAGE:




The Southeastern counties of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky are some of the most naturally beautiful and
historically isolated areas in the Eastern United States. They are
also some of the most economically depressed counties in the
nation, with high rates of drug addiction, unemployment, and
reliance upon government benefits. President Lyndon Johnson
famously visited Martin County, Kentucky, in 1964 as part of his
efforts to gain support for his newly-announced "War on
Poverty".1 At the time of President Johnson's visit, this coal-
mining county had a poverty rate of over 60 percent.2
The fact that Eastern Kentucky was a launching point for
the War on Poverty is appropriate based on the abject poverty
that faced much of the population in the 1960s, and even to the
present day. The great tragedy of Eastern Kentucky, however, is
that it historically contained some of the greatest mineral wealth
of any area in the United States. For more than a century,
billions of dollars of coal have been mined, processed, and
transported out of the Eastern Kentucky coalfields. Even today,
* Noah R. Friend is the General Counsel to Kentucky State Treasurer Allison J.
Ball. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kentucky in 2004, and a J.D. from the University of Kentucky College of
Law in 2007. After clerking for U.S. Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins, he opened a
private firm in Pikeville, Kentucky, with an emphasis on bankruptcy and federal practice.
In 2016, he was named General Counsel by Treasurer Ball, and relocated to Versailles,
Kentucky. This discussion was presented in part at the KJEANRL Third Annual
Symposium, "Faces of the Bluegrass," held on February 28, 2017. The author would like to
thank Clay Larkin, of Dinsmore and Shohl in Lexington, for his contributions on issues of
regulatory policy. He would also like to thank Treasurer Ball for her insights. Finally, he
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I Kentucky County that Gave War on Poverty a Face Still Struggles (National
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billions of dollars of coal remain untouched under the rolling hills
of Kentucky's Eastern counties. For reasons discussed herein, the
rich mineral deposits have not created widespread wealth for the
region's inhabitants. Over the last few decades, however, coal has
infused the region with hundreds of millions of dollars in annual
wages and taxes and has employed tens of thousands in the
mines, transportation, and support industries.
These gains have been jeopardized, as Eastern Kentucky
has become ground zero in a new "war" waged by the federal
government, the so-called "War on Coal".3 During his campaign in
2008, then-Senator Barack Obama professed a strong belief in
the need to increase federal regulation of carbon-emitting
industries such as electric utilities. The steadily mined dark
black mineral seams in the Eastern Kentucky coalfields were set
directly in the crosshairs of federal agencies. The conflict between
the Obama administration and those who sought to prevent the
decline of the coal industry and its customers became the highly-
politicized War on Coal.
It appears that this new "war has been much more
successful in hitting its target than LBJ's crusade against
poverty. The coalfield's greatest industry has been staggered by a
series of federal enactments that make mining more difficult and
cause the largest consumers of Eastern Kentucky coal to begin
transitioning to alternate energy sources. As a new
administration takes office and takes aim at reversing Obama-
era policies, it is appropriate to: (1) discuss the Obama-era
policies that contributed to the rapid industry decline during the
past decade; (2) quantify the industry losses suffered in the
Eastern Kentucky coalfields in the past two decades; and (3)
discuss steps that can be taken to avoid another such downturn
in the future. Before doing so, it is appropriate to briefly review
the history of coal and its impact on Eastern Kentucky.
3 Osofsky and Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 Emory L.J. 695 (2016).
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II. EASTERN KENTUCKY COAL PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT PRE-2008
A. Briefllistory & Overview
Coal has been commercially mined in small quantities in
Kentucky since the early 1800s. Since 1879, the Commonwealth
of Kentucky has produced coal in excess of one million tons per
year.4 Eastern Kentucky coal experienced a massive increase in
production between 1910 and 1925, fueled by the extension of
railroad branch lines into the area.6
The Eastern Kentucky coalfields provided much of the
energy behind America's rise as an industrial superpower. The
bituminous coal mined in Eastern Kentucky was a primary
energy source for Midwestern cities such as Pittsburgh, Chicago,
and Cincinnati. Eastern Kentucky coal deposits were used to
power steam locomotives and in iron and steel mills throughout
the Midwest.6 Coal from the operations of U.S. Coal and Coke in
Lynch (Harlan) County, were used in U.S. Steel's mills in Gary,
Indiana.7 Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century,
Appalachian coal accounted for nearly 80 percent of national
production.8
The rise of Eastern Kentucky coal created a substantial
amount of wealth. Unfortunately, from the beginning, the wealth
was not centered in the coalfields themselves. Business interests
from outside the area had the capital to purchase vast swaths of
territory from the people of Appalachia, including Eastern
Kentucky.9 Outside business interests had little incentive or
desire to purchase the property itself but wanted only to obtain
4 Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet Department for Energy
Development and Independence, Kentucky Coal Facts, 16th Ed. (2016) at 6 (hereinafter
Ky. Coal Facts 1t Ed.).
5 Ronald D. Eller, Miners, Millbands and Mountaineers, Industrialzation of the
Appalachian South, 1880-1930, UNIV. OF TENN. PRESS, KNOXVILLE 1982 at 140.
6 Ky. Coal Facts 16 Ed., supra note 4.
7 Eller, supra note 3, at 147.
8 Id. at 128.
9 Id. at 141-48.
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rights in the minerals; purchasing the entire property would have
subjected the investors to greater tax liability.' 0
In order to most effectively obtain the needed rights in the
property, without incurring undue liability, companies entered
into either "short form" or "broad form" deeds with local
landowners, which conveyed the owners' interests in the minerals
underlying their land." The "broad form" deed would prove to be
extremely detrimental to the landowners, as it conveyed a bundle
of rights that the often uneducated and illiterate landowners
could hardly grasp:
The broad form deeds passed to the coal companies
title to all coal, oil and gas and all "mineral and
metallic substances and all combinations of the
same." They authorized the grantees to excavate
for minerals, to build roads and structures on the
land and to use the surface for any purpose
"convenient and necessary" to the company and its
successors in title. Their wordy covenants passed to
the coal men the right to utilize as mining props
the timber growing on the land, to divert and
pollute the water and to cover the surface with
toxic mining refuse. The landowner's estate was
made perpetually "servient" to the superior or
"dominant" rights of the owner of the minerals.12
In addition, the broad form deeds contained clauses that
absolved the mining company for any damages the landowner
suffered either "directly or indirectly" from the mining
operations.13
During the late 19th and early-20th centuries, local
landowners were giving away these rights for a few dollars an
acre, at best.14 For example, in 1890, a Pike County landowner
10 DAvIS, WENDY B., Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown ofling Coal.,
51 AM. U. L. REV. 905-66, 913 (2002).
11 CAUDILL, HARRY M., Night Comes to the Cumberlands at 74 (1963).
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 1d.
1
4 Davis, supra note 10 at 912-13 (listing incidents).
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signed a lease giving the coal mining company rights for 999
years for the price of one dollar per acre, plus two dollars per acre
for use of the surface.'5 Other studies have indicated that mineral
rights were sold for as low as twenty-five or fifty cents an acre.16
Of course, this minimal price per acre did little to provide
any long-term economic stability for the landowner or local
economy. For example, the landowner often signed away rights to
recover damages from mining operations if damages occurred to
the surface property.1" As mining operations improved and
expanded in Eastern Kentucky during the 1920s, an operator
could recover anywhere from 5,000 to 20,000 tons of coal per
acre.'8 This resulted in a massive profit for the operator, no
portion of which would be returned to the landowner.
The devastating effects of these deeds were felt for
generations, as subsequent heirs and purchasers of the property
were subject to the restrictions therein. Often, these deeds would
frustrate the ability of the surface owner to utilize the surface of
the land itself. For example, in McIntire v. Marion Coal Co., the
high court of Kentucky found that the plain terms of a deed
allowed the coal company to build structures upon the land, and
that the company could "by showing the necessity or convenience
thereof, use and occupy the whole surface of the land in question
even to excluding the plaintiff and taking his house and
garden."19
In the 1956 case of Buchanan v. Watson, Kentucky's
highest court was faced with a situation where mineral rights in
a tract of land had been conveyed in 1903; the original
conveyance included broad language regarding the right to
remove the minerals.20 Due to the conditions of the land, the only
way for the coal operator to remove the coal was by using the
u5 Id.
1 6 ELLER, supra note 5, at 56; CAUDILL, supra note 11, at 75.
17 ELLER, supra note 5.
18 CAUDILL, supra note 11, at 75.
19 McIntire v. Marion Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, 300 (Ky. 1921) (the court did
indicate that taking the house and garden "would have to be after satisfaction or adjudged
compensation for such improvements.").
2 Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. 1956), overruled by Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 306 (Ky. 1987), and Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Ky.
1993).
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"strip and auger method." The surface owner objected, arguing
that such removal was not contemplated at the time of the
original conveyance and that such a method of removal would
"destroy the surface and timber of a substantial area."2 1 The court
ruled that, despite the uncontroverted evidence that the strip and
auger method would result in the destruction of the surface, the
owner of the mineral estate had a right to utilize "the only
feasible process of extracting the coal."2 2
According to the Buchanan court, "the paramount purpose
of the conveyance was to enable the grantee, or his successor in
title, to remove the coal from under the surface of this land. The
value of the land lay under the surface, not on it."23 In
determining that the surface owner was not entitled to recover
for damages to the surface, the court found "[tihe owner of the
mineral has the paramount right to the use of the surface in the
prosecution of its business for any purpose of necessity or
convenience, unless this power is exercised oppressively,
arbitrarily, wantonly, or maliciously."24 The Buchanan decision
was not an outlier; indeed, courts in Kentucky consistently issued
rulings that favored the mineral owner over the owner of the
surface rights.25 The rules enunciated in Buchanan would remain
the law of the land until they were scaled back by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in 198726 and 1993.27
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 43.
24 Id.
2 See e.g. Case v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 276 S.W. 573 (Ky. 1925) (rejecting most
of surface owner's claim for damages from mineral owner's decision to clear a strip of
timber for an electric transmission line); United Carbon Co. v. Webb, 137 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Ky. 1940) (finding that, per terms of deed, surface owner could not recover damages for
mineral owner's actions of building roads and ditches, laying above-ground pipelines,
ruining agricultural purposes of surface by depositing waste thereon).
26 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 306 (Ky. 1987) (noting that the rule
announced in Buchanan was "detrimental to the public interest" and was overruled
insofar as it permitted mineral owners to damage the surface without paying damages,
with the exception of "where the conveyance expressly sets out the methods of mining that
may be employed and a waiver of damages from the use of such methods.").
2 Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Ky. 1993) (noting that Buchanan was
overruled to the extent that it created a presumption that conveyance by broad form deed
included a right to surface mining.).
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The effect of the broad form deed and decisions such as
Buchanan was that the wealth from these early years of coal
production was, for the most part, removed from Eastern
Kentucky.28 Left behind were surface lands that were often
physically scarred or economically worthless due to the fact that
they were subservient to the mineral estate. Some native
individuals were able to become very wealthy from the coal
industry, such as John C.C. Mayo of Johnson County. Mayo
became extremely wealthy through accumulating leases or land
totaling between 500,000 and 700,000 acres, and was known as
Eastern Kentucky's "first millionaire."29
Men like Mayo were an anomaly. The best money that
most Eastern Kentuckians could make was through working in
the mines. During the early 1900s, Eastern Kentucky farm
laborers could hope to make between fifty and seventy-five cents
a day; miners, on the other hand, could make between two and
four dollars a day.30 At the height of the coal boom during the
early 1900s, nearly 65 percent of the miners in Eastern Kentucky
and southwest Virginia lived in the nearly 500 company towns or
"camps" in the region. The number of coal "camps" was
significantly higher than the number of incorporated towns.31
Most of these camps were tightly controlled by the coal
companies. While some of them were described as "model towns"
that provided a life much more comfortable than anywhere else in
the region,32 many of them did little to impart significant long-
term economic benefit upon the miners or their families.33
Mining was hard, dangerous work, but there was little
other work in the region. As laws, attitudes, and safety standards
improved, coal mining provided the region's best and largest
source of employment. Even by the end of the 1920s, miners could
2 JAMEs C. KLOTTER, KENTUCKY: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 1900-1950 at 27.
(1996).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 28.
31 ELLER at 162. ELLER, supra note 5, at 162; Coal Camp Documentary Project,
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, https://appalachianprojects.as.uky.edulcoal-camps
[https://perma.ccl7SZL-TTF6].
32 KLOTTER, supra note 28, at 29
3 See generally ,CAUDILL, supra note 11, at 142. (describing the changing of
conditions upon the arrival of coal companies).
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make $4.00 for an eight-hour workday. They began to accumulate
small savings, purchase items like the Model-T Fords, and enjoy
the movie theaters, poolrooms, and restaurants being built in and
around the camps.3 4 Even during the "good years" of the coal
boom, however, and into the 1930s, the region was occasionally
beset with labor unrest and violence as unions and companies
clashed over unionization, wages, and safety.35
As a result of the expansion of railroads and the influx of
cash, local communities surrounding the mining camps saw
increased population and connection with the outside world.
However, while there was benefit from the general trade that
came along with the coal boom, the lack of strong, independent
political leadership at all levels of government prevented the local
communities from instituting many beneficial policies that would
have been detrimental to the coal operators.36 For example, the
coal severance tax, which provided a per-ton tax on coal removed
from the land, with a portion returned to the local county
governments, was not instituted until 1972.37
The coal severance tax currently provides a tax of 4.5
percent on the sale price of every ton of coal mined in Kentucky.38
For example, if a ton of coal sells for $50, then the tax revenue is
$2.25. The coal severance tax is split among multiple state
budgetary programs, including the General Fund, Local
Government Economic Assistance Fund and the Local
Government Economic Development Fund.39 Unfortunately, for
the first twenty years of its existence, by some estimates, only 7.6
percent of the $2.7 billion in severance taxes went back to coal
counties.40 This unfortunate statistic represents another instance
3 Id. at 142.
as See generally CAUDILL, supra note 11, at 188-205 (explaining easing tensions
between miners and coal companies).
36 CAUDILL, supra note 11, at 124.
37 Ky. Coal Facts (2016), supra note 4, at 12.
38 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.020 (West 1978).
3 See Ky. Rev. Stat. 42.450-42.495; See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.450-42.495
(West 1972); Coal Development Branch, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (July 2016), https://kydlgweb.ky.gov/StateGrants/Coal.cfm
[https://perma.cc/P6K7-65VM].1ast viewed
40 Bailey, Jason, Investing in a Future for Appalachian Kentucky' The Coal
Severance Tax, KENTUCKY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY (Apr. 2013), p.2 2 (Apr. 21,
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of wealth being transferred out of the coalfields, rather than
being reinvested in the region.
From the 1930s through the 1990s, the region was subject
to a boom-and-bust economic cycle. The mines flourished during
the demand for wartime coal in the 1940s, which peaked
employment in Eastern Kentucky to 66,410 miners in 1948 and
contracted again thereafter.41 From the 1940s through the 1970s,
the rising demand for coal for electric generation caused an
increase in production.4 Kentucky produced over 100 million tons
of coal in 1967, the first time the state had hit that benchmark;
Kentucky became the nation's leading coal-producing state in
1971, a title it would retain until it was displaced in 1988.4
From peak employment of over 66,000 in 1948, the
number of miners in Eastern Kentucky steadily dropped, with
occasional increases based on "booms" in the market. Snapshots
of the market during ten-year intervals show the changes in the
market since 1956:
TABLE 1
Commonwealth of Kentucky State Totals4
Year Miners - State Production - State Productivity
Total Total in millions of (tons per
tons miner/hour)
1956 34,971 75.9 million Not available
1966 21,159 93.2 million Not available
1976 41,470 142.6 million 1.86* (1977
figure)
1986 34,455 165.6 million 2.45
1996 18,826 152.4 million 3.80
2013), http://www.kypolicy.us/sites/kcep/fdes/Coal%20Severance%2OPresentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4GT-XK441.
41 Ky. Coal Facts 16th Ed., supra note 4, at 8-9.
42Id. at 8.
4 Id. at 11-12.
4 Information gathered from the annual Kentucky Coal Facts publication. There
are some minor discrepancies between certain information maintained by the U.S.
Department of Energy, and information published in Kentucky Coal Facts. For sake of
consistency, and as none of the discrepancies are statistically significant, numbers
published in the Kentucky Coal Facts will be used throughout the table.
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Year Miners - State Production - State Productivity
Total Total in millions of (tons per
tons miner/hour)
2006 17,959 125 million 3.13
2016 6,371 42.5 million 2.84* (2015
figure)
A review of the table notes that between 1976 and 2006, there
was a significant loss of mining jobs, but a concurrent increase in
tonnage and a near doubling of productivity. During the time
frame from 1950 until 1995, coal mining productivity nationwide
increased at an average annual rate of approximately 4 percent,
with Appalachian surface and underground productivity
increasing at an average annual rate of approximately 2
percent.4
The increased productivity and mechanization of Eastern
Kentucky mines led to the steady decline of mine employment,
and the steady increase in production during the period from the
1950s to the 1990s. Quite simply, fewer miners were needed to
extract more coal.
B. Eastern Kentucky Coal in 1996 & 2006
Before examining the recent problems faced by the coal
industry, it is useful to get a slightly more in-depth snapshot of
the coal industry over the past twenty years. To that end, an
examination of the industry in 1996 and 2006 is warranted. As
previously discussed, numerous factors contributed to coal profits
being funneled out of Eastern Kentucky. By the late twentieth
century, coal remained the single most important industry to the
Eastern Kentucky economy. Wages, coal severance taxes, and
indirect employment in support industries provided hundreds of
millions of dollars to local economies.
4 Darmstadter, Productivity Change in US. Coal Miing Discussion, Paper 97-
40, 1, S-I (1997).
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In 1996, Eastern Kentucky produced 117 million tons of
coal, and directly employed over 15,000 miners.46 By far the
largest consumer of Eastern Kentucky coal in 1996 were electric
utilities, which consumed 75 percent of the coal produced in the
Eastern Kentucky coalfields.47 This coal was shipped to 118
power plants in 22 states.48 Coal companies paid $116 million in
coal severance taxes on $2.6 billion of coal mined from Eastern
Kentucky counties.49 Approximately 95.7% of Kentucky's
electricity was generated from coal and, in 1996, average
electricity costs were 4.1 cents per kilowatt hour.50 Coal sales to
foreign counties and states brought in $3.1 billion to the state
economy.51
The importance of the industry to the Eastern Kentucky
economy is readily apparent by reviewing the wages paid to
miners. In 1996, Eastern Kentucky miners received $610 million
in direct wages.5 2 On average, coal miners were paid
approximately $40,000.00 a year, which was double the state's
average per capita income.5 3 As shown by Table 2, in the ten
largest coal-producing counties in Eastern Kentucky, this
represented a huge portion of the wages paid to workers within
the counties.
TABLE 2
Employment and Wages - 199654
County [EKY Number of Miners as % of % of Total
Rank Miners Labor Force County Wages
Pike Il 4,649 17% 34%
Martin [2] 1,049 31% 62%
6 Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet Department for Energy
Development and Independence, Kentucky Coal Facts, 5th Ed. (1997-1998) at 9-12
(hereinafter Ky. Coal Facts 5th Ed.).
4 Id. at 20.
8 Id. at 21.
9 Id. at 17.
5o Id. at 1.
5' Id. at 17.
52 Id. at 14.
53 Id. at 15.
54 Id. at 1.
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County [EKY Number of Miners as % of % of Total
Rank Miners Labor Force County Wages
Harlan [31 1,373 15% 32%
Perry [41 938 8.3% 16%
Leslie [51 1,307 31% 60%
Knott [61 1,339 23% 56%
Floyd [71 786 5.5% 11%
Breathitt [81 218 5% 15%
Bell [91 907 9% 17%
Johnson [101 232 2.3% 6%
Table 2 does not reflect wages paid to workers in "indirect" coal
jobs such as transportation and support industries; there were
approximately 60,000 such "indirect" coal jobs in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky in 1996.55
By 2006, the industry had suffered some losses in
employment and production. Eastern Kentucky produced
approximately 64 million tons of coal, compared to 117 million in
1996.56 By 2006, Eastern Kentucky coal was even more reliant on
electric utilities, with 87 percent of Eastern Kentucky coal being
delivered to coal-fired power plants.57 The industry had also lost
approximately 800 mining jobs over the course of ten years, a loss
of five percent of the mining workforce since 1996.58 Average
annual wages had risen to approximately $57,000.00 per year.5 9
However, wages had increased to $826 million, with coal
severance receipts of $166 million on $3.7 billion of extracted
coal.60 Table 3 reflects 2006 employment and wages in the same
ten counties previously shown in Table 2.
55 Id. at 1.
56 Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet Department for Energy
Development and Independence, Kentucky (Oal Facts, 10th Ed., (2007-08) at 9
(hereinafter Ky. Coal Facts 10th Ed.).
57 Id. at 19.
5 Id. at 12.
9 Id. at 12.
6 Id. at 14-16.
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TABLE 3
Employment and Wages - 200661
County Number of Miners as % of Total Loss/Gain
[1996 EKY Miners % of County Since 1996
Rankl Labor Wages
Force
Pike [11 4,305 17% 30% -344 (7%)
Martin [21 617 17% 40% -432 (-41%)
Harlan [31 1,318 13% 31% -55 (-4%)
Perry [41 1,746 15% 24% + 808
(+86%)
Leslie [51 532 14% 45% - 775 (-
60%)
Knott [61 1,408 21% 60% + 69 (+5%)
Floyd [71 986 6.5% 13% + 200
(+25%)
Breathitt 175 3% 12% -43 (-20%)
[81
Bell [91 1,038 11% 18% +131
(+14%)
Johnson 158 1.6 4% - 74 (-32%)
[101
Despite the production drop from 1996 levels and the
slight loss of employment, coal was still a billion-dollar industry
in Eastern Kentucky, providing huge portions of county wages.
Table 3 shows that there were changes in county-level
employment, with some counties losing jobs as mines closed, and
others gaining jobs as new facilities were opened, or production
increased. It is worth noting that a large portion of the job loss
from the 1970s to the 1990s, (see Table 1) was attributable to
mechanization, and the fact that productivity (tons/miner/hour)
had doubled from 1.71 tons per hour in 1977, to 3.68 tons per
61 Id. at 12.
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hour in 1996.62 Productivity actually decreased from 3.68 tons per
hour in 1996 to 2.78 tons per hour in 2006.63 Therefore, job losses
between 1996 and 2006 more closely reflected a slight drop in
overall coal production rather than increased mechanization.
C Summary ofEconomic Impact Through 2006
From the coal boom of the early 1900s through 2006, the
Eastern Kentucky coal industry was subject o fluctuations based
on general economic conditions. Employment steadily decreased
after peaking in the late 1940s, as increased mechanization
eliminated the need for many mining jobs. The industry was,
nonetheless, the region's largest source of non-governmental
funds, and by far the largest supplier of high paying jobs for
people who lacked a college degree. Coal severance taxes provided
a pivotal part of the tax base for Eastern Kentucky counties, who
mostly lacked other large-scale industries to fill the local coffers.
In sum, coal was still king in Eastern Kentucky, but it was
about to face an existential threat from outside its borders.
III. REGULATORY AND POLICY CHANGES DURING
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
In 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama infamously stated,
"if somebody wants to build a coal power plant, they can. It's just
that it will bankrupt them because they are going to be charged a
huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that's being emitted."64
During the eight years of his presidency, changes in federal
environmental and energy policy resulted in a dramatic shift in
the energy industry. Per industry sources, hundreds of coal-fired
electric generation units are being retired or converted to another
62 Id. at 11.
63 Id.
6 Glenn Kessler, The repeated claim that Obama "vowed" to bankrupt coal
plants, Washington Post Fact Checker (Oct. 8, 2014) (citing interview conducted by San
Francisco Chronicle in January 2008), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2014/10/08/the-repeated-claim-that-obama-vowed-to-bankrupt-coal-
plants/?utmterm=.cf5c73d7db48 [https://perma.cc/GD6P-T66Y (last viewed Apr. 10,
2017).
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energy source due to Obama-era policies.6 5 These units represent
approximately a quarter of coal-fired power generating capacity."
To determine why coal-fired plants and mining operations were
so devastated by Obama-era regulations, several key enactments
are discussed briefly below.6 '
A. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards ('MATS")
As amended in 1990, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") imposed
many requirements on fossil-fuel-fired power plants. This
included a requirement that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") regulate "hazardous air pollutants."68 Notably,
the amendments allowed the EPA to regulate hazardous air
pollutants only if "appropriate and necessary" after study of the
issue.69
In 2012, the EPA issued the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards Rule ("MATS"), finding that regulation was
"appropriate and necessary" because "(1) power plants' emissions
of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants posed risks to
human health and the environment and (2) controls were
available to reduce these emissions."70 The EPA determined that
the regulation was 'necessary' because the imposition of the Act's
other requirements did not eliminate these risks."7 ' In imposing
the rule, the EPA "concluded that costs should not be
considered."72 The EPA placed a compliance deadline in early
2015.
65 American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity ("ACCCE"), Retirement of Coal-
Fired Electric Generating Units (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.americaspower.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Coal-Unit-Retirements-February-25-2017.pdf
[https://perma.ccl4KA7-FQCZ]; see also J.C. Reindl, 25 lichigan Coal Plants Are Set to
Retire by 2020, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 10, 2015.
66 ACCCE, supra note 65.
67 Much has been written on the specifics of each of these rules, and an in-depth
discussion of each is beyond the purview of the present writing. Where appropriate,
citations to more focused studies of particular acts will be provided.
- See 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
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The costs, which the EPA expressly stated that it was not
considering, were estimated to be $9.6 billion per year, while
benefits were approximately $4 million to $6 million per year.73
The Supreme Court noted that the costs, therefore, were
"between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as the quantifiable
benefits from reduced emissions."74 The Supreme Court struck
down the MATS rule in 2015, finding that the EPA was
unreasonable to "read an instruction... to determine whether
'regulation is appropriate and necessary' as an invitation to
ignore cost."75
Unfortunately, the victory over the EPA in 2015 came
after the compliance deadline set forth in the MATS Rule, so
many power plants had already expended funds to come into
compliance with the Rule and had moved, or made plans to move,
away from coal. Coal was a casualty of these changes because the
standards made natural gas a more attractive alternative for
generating electricity.7 6
B. Ozone NAAQS Revisions
Another provision of the Clean Air Act called for the
promulgation of rules known as the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS").77 The NAAQS have become
progressively more stringent, and in 2012, the EPA issued its list
of areas designated as "nonattainment." Such a designation
requires states to develop a "state implementation plan ("SIP")
specifying how emissions will be reduced in order to meet the
NAAQS." 78 The EPA knew that NAAQS and the subsequent SIPs
would allow them to "impose controls on existing power plants",
which were considered to be significant sources of emissions.7 9
73 Id. at 2705-06.
74 Id. at 2706.
75 Id. at 2708.
76 See Davies & Luman, The Role ofNatural Gas in the Clean Power Plan, 49 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 325, 352 (2016).
77 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409.
78 See Arnold Reitz, The National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 6
Ariz. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 421, 426 (2015)
79 See Id. at 441.
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The EPA estimates that costs of compliance will run into the
billions.80 Along with the MATS Rule, the NAAQS revisions
imposed significant costs on coal-fired plants, and encouraged
movement away from coal.
C. Clean Water Act Permitting
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") regulates the discharge of
pollutants into the waters of the United States.8' Among other
things, the CWA requires a permitting process for the discharge
of fill materials or pollutants that are known as Section 402 and
Section 404 permits, respectively.82 Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1311,
it is required that "every [Section 4021 permit contain (1) effluent
limitations that reflect the pollution reduction available by using
technologically practicable controls, and (2) any more stringent
pollutant release limitations necessary for the waterway
receiving the pollutant to meet water quality standards."83
In 2009, the EPA, the Department of the Interior, and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers entered into a "memorandum of
understanding" entitled "Implementing the Interagency Action
Plan on Appalachian Surface Coal Mining."M The purpose of the
memorandum of understanding was to increase the ability of the
EPA to "screen" and "discuss" applications for certain mining
permits submitted to the Corps of Engineers.85 This enhanced
coordination effort was expressly and directly aimed at the
Appalachian region, with the primary impact being felt in West
Virginia and Kentucky, where surface coal mining is a standard
practice.8< In addition to the memorandum of understanding, the
8 Id.
81 The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1388 (1987).
82 The Clean Water Act, § 1342 (describing the permit application process for a
pollutant discharge elimination system); The Clean Water Act § 1344 (describing the
permit application process for dredge and fill material).
83 See Am. Paper Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
8 See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
85 Id.
86 EPA, Memorandum of Understanding, Implementing the Interagency Action
Plan on Appalachian Surface Coal Ming, EPA 1 (2009), https//www.epa.gov/sc-
mining/june-2009-memorandum-understanding-among-army-department-interior-and-
epa-implementing[https//perma.cclB8PU-DBTK] (last viewed, Apr. 21, 2017).
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EPA also promulgated a final guidance document in 2011, which,
inter alia, "recommends that states impose more stringent
conditions for issuing certain Clean Water Act permits."87
The states of West Virginia and Kentucky, along with coal
and trade association plaintiffs, sued in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia challenging both the enhanced
coordination effort and final guidance. The states were successful
at the trial court level, as the district court found that the EPA
had "overstepped its statutory authority" under the CWA and the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.8 8 However, the
EPA successfully appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which overturned the lower
court decision and found that the federal agencies were acting
within their authority in both the enhanced coordination effort
and the final guidance document.8 9
In June 2015, the EPA promulgated the final rule entitled
"Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States."9 o
The new definition provided by this rule expanded the definition
of bodies of water that can be regulated as a "water of the United
States."9 1 A wide range of industries, including both the mining
and power sectors, lobbied unsuccessfully against the
implementation of this rule, which simply added another weapon
to the federal government's arsenal.92
C. SMCRA Permitting & Enforcement
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("SMCRA") requires those who are engaged in surface coal
mining to comply with certain permitting requirements and
8 McCarthy, 758 F.3d at 246.
8 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119, 142 (D.C. Dist. 2012).
8 See McCarthy, 758 F.3d at 246.
90 Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States", 80 Fed. Reg.
37054 (June 29, 2015).
9i Ashleigh Allione, The Battle Over US. Water Why the Clean Water Rule
'Flows" Within the Bounds ofSupreme Court Precedent, 66 Am. U.L. Rev. 145 (2016).
9 JENNY HOPINSON, Obama's Water War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118319
[https://perma.ccIL28Y-KB8Y], May 27, 2015 (last viewed Apr. 22, 2017).
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environmental protection standards.93 The Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") in the
Department of the Interior, is charged with overseeing
implementation of SMCRA.94
SMCRA and OSM have a great deal of impact on surface
mining operations in the Eastern Kentucky coalfields. One of the
most important changes made in the Obama era was the proposal
of a revised stream buffer zone rule, titled the "Stream Protection
Rule."95 The Stream Protection Rule retains a 100-foot buffer
between mines and waterways and includes other provisions
regarding establishment of water quality standards, increasing
the scope of land area to be considered during permitting, and
redefining terms such as "material damage" to hydrologic balance
and "approximate original contour."96
The Stream Protection Rule is particularly relevant to
surface mining areas in West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky, as the
topography is replete with streams that would be covered by the
rule. According to experts, the rule "would have effectively made
mountaintop removal uneconomical."97 According to a congressional
report, the rule would have a minimum of $52 million in annual
compliance costs for the coal industry, with approximately 46
percent of this cost to be borne by Appalachian mining operations.98
- See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1202.
94 Beck, supra at 640. Robert E. Beck, Water and Coal Mining in Appalachia:
Applying the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Clean Water
Act, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 629, 641 (2004).
5 Stream Protection Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,436 (July 27, 2015) (to be codified at
30 C.F.R. pt. 700).
9 Id.
9 Hiroko Tabuchi, Republicans Move to Block Rule on Coal Mining Near
Streams, N.Y.TIMES (Feb 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/energy-
environment/senate-coal-regulations.html?_r-0.
9 Specialist in Res. and Envtl. Policy, Cong. Research Serv., The Office of
Surface Mining's Stream Protection Rule: An Overview (2017).
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D. Clean Power Plan
The Clean Power Plan was issued by the EPA in August of
2015.9 The Clean Power Plan represents a massive shift in
regulatory authority of the energy industry by giving the EPA
unprecedented authority over the nation's energy sector. The Clean
Power Plan seeks to "reduce carbon dioxide [l emissions from fossil
fuel-fired power plants by more than 32% nationwide by 2030.100
Coal-fired power plants are a clear target of the Clean
Power Plan, as they are required to "install new or upgraded
technologies to improve their heat rates", while another section
seeks to require deployment of "low or zero-carbon emitting
generating resources", which directly shifts generation away from
coal.10 1 As noted earlier, in 2006 nearly 90 percent of Eastern
Kentucky coal was directed to electric utilities, making the Clean
Power Plan an existential threat to the primary market for
Eastern Kentucky coal.
IV. REPERCUSSIONS OF OBAMA-ERA ON
THE EASTERN KENTUCKY COAL INDUSTRY
The Obama Administration introduced a wide range of
heightened standards and regulations on both the coal industry
and electric utilities; though there are detractors who believe the
administration did not go far enough. 102 The cost of compliance on
these changes runs into the tens of billions of dollars, and the
economic impact goes far beyond the actual costs of coming into
compliance with the letter of the law. The fragile economy of
Eastern Kentucky, so heavily reliant upon the coal industry,
reflects the result of overreaching federal policy.0 3
99 William S. Scherman & Jason J. Fleischer, The Environmental Protection
Agency and the Clean Power Plan. A Paradigm Shift in Energy Regulation Away from
Energy Regulators, 36 ENERGY L. J. 355 (2015).
1oo Id
101 Id. at 364.
102 Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Regulation and EPA Disincentives, 45
ENVTL. L. 19 (2015)
03 There are, of course, other factors that have played into the decline of coal
production and use during the past decade, including the rise of natural gas as an energy
source. The author posits that the rise of natural gas is not completely the result of free
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A. Production, Employment & Economic Impact
The policies discussed above had an immediate and
devastating impact on the Eastern Kentucky coal industry. In
2016, Eastern Kentucky produced only 16.6 million tons of coal,
whereas in 2008 it had produced 91 million tons.104 In 2008, the
Eastern Kentucky coalfields employed over 14,000 miners; by the
end of 2016, that number had dropped to less than 4,000.105
County-by-county figures for Eastern Kentucky in 2016 are not
yet available, but the figures from 2015 paint a dark picture for
the Eastern Kentucky labor force:
TABLE 4
Eastern Kentucky Coal Jobs 2015106
Couj [KY Number of Miners as % of Job Loss Since
Rankl Miners Labor Force 2006
Pike [11 1,591 7% -2,714 (-63%)
Martin [2] 401 13% -216 (-35%)
Harlan [31 867 10% -451 (34%)
Perry [4] 966 9% -780 (-45%)
Leslie [51 245 7% -287 (-54%)
Knott [61 252 4.5% - 1,156 (-82%)
Floyd [7] 432 3% -554 (-56%)
Breathitt [81 48 0.9% -127 (72%)
Bell [91 376 4% -662 (-64%)
Johnson [101 51 0.6% -107 (-71%)
In 2006, wages and coal severance taxes brought over $1
billion to the coal-producing counties of Eastern Kentucky;
market forces, but was heavily influenced by the crushing federal regulations on the coal
industry and the need for energy producers to find another source.
'0 Ky. Energy and Env't Cabinet, Ky. Quarterly Coal Report Oct. to Dec. 2016 5
(2017).
05 Id. at 4.
106 Ky. Coal Facts 10th Ed,, supra note 56, at 31.
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estimates for 2016 are that amounts will be well-below $500
million. 107
The precipitous drop in production and employment is
unprecedented in the history of the Eastern Kentucky coalfields.
Coal production fell by over 80 percent in Eastern Kentucky
between 2006 and the end of 2016; likewise, employment dropped
by over 70 percent. As noted on Table 1, prior drops in
employment were still normally accompanied by a rise in
production; this was a natural impact of increased mechanization
of the coal industry. The prior production drop between 1996 and
2006 was accompanied by a small drop in employment as well. At
no time have ten-year production and employment figures both
dropped so dramatically.
The economic impact on the region has been devastating,
as thousands of skilled workers are unable to find work in the
coal industry, and local economies and governments have been
deprived of hundreds of millions of dollars of annual revenue.
B. Political Fallout
The devastating effects of the "War on Coal" have
contributed to the dramatic shift in voting patterns in the coal
fields. From 1964 until 2004, Kentucky's popular vote was
aligned with the ultimate winner in each presidential election.
The state voted seven times for victorious Republicans (Nixon
twice, Reagan twice, George H.W. Bush once, George W. Bush
twice) and voted three times for victorious Democrats (Carter
once, Bill Clinton twice). This trend ended in 2008 and 2012,
when the state voted overwhelmingly against Barack Obama.
When incumbent President Bill Clinton won the electoral
votes from the state of Kentucky in 1996, the last Democrat to do
so, he scored a narrow victory over Senator Bob Dole (45-44
percent). Clinton was carried to victory by extremely strong
showings in the Eastern Kentucky coalfields, winning the
popular vote in nine of the ten largest coal producing-counties,
107 Ky. Coal Facts 10th Ed, supra note 56, at 34-35. Final figures for 2016 are
not yet available, and estimates must be extrapolated using numbers available from the
reporting covering year ending December 31, 2015.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
and by double-digit margins in seven out of ten counties.08 The
results are shown in the table below.
TABLE 5
Presidential Election Results in Top 10 Eastern Kentucky
Coal Producing Co nties in 1996109
County [EKY Clinton % Dole % Actual Total
Rank] Vote Margin
for Clinton
Pike [11 60% 30% +6,966
Martin [2] 47% 38% + 195
Harlan [31 58% 33% + 2,537
Perry [41 58% 33% +2,633
Leslie [51 35% 56% - 830
Knott [6] 73% 18% + 3,641
Floyd [71 67% 22% + 6,516
Breathitt [81 67% 23% + 2,048
Bell [91 50% 39% + 1,141
Johnson [101 43% 42% + 86
President Clinton won these Eastern Kentucky counties by a
total of approximately 25,000 votes. His margin in the state as a
whole was only 13,000; therefore his margins in Eastern
Kentucky were essential to his victory.
When Hillary Clinton ran for President in 2016, the
results were radically different, President Trump carried the
state by 30 points, and Hillary Clinton lost in every one of these
ten counties by a minimum of 40 percent points.110
io8 1996 Primary and General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/1990-
1999/1996/96Gen-president.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (percentages are approximate,
and vote totals for third party candidate Ross Perot are not shown).
109 Id.; Ky. Coal Facts 5th Ed., supra note 46, at 9. Though the rank of these
counties has changed over the past twenty years, for the sake of comparison, these ten
counties will be examined throughout the remainder of this discussion.
I0 2016 General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/results/2010-
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TABLE 6
Presidential Election Results in 2016111
County [1996 Clinton % Trump % Loss in
EKY Rank] Dem Vote
Pike [11 17% 80% - 43%
Martin [21 9% 89% - 38%
Harlan [31 13% 85% - 45%
Perry [41 20% 77% - 38%
Leslie [51 9% 89% - 26%
Knott [61 21% 76% - 51%
Floyd [71 24% 72% - 43%
Breathitt [81 27% 70% - 40%
Bell [91 18% 80% - 32%
Johnson [101 13% 84% - 30%
This followed two election cycles in 2008 and 2012 in which
President Barack Obama suffered extremely heavy losses in the
coalfields as well.112 The anger toward "establishment" Democrats
in Washington D.C. was further evidenced by the fact that
2019/Documents/2016%2OGeneral%20Election%2OResults.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2017)
(percentages are approximate, and vote totals for third party candidates are not included).
"' Id.
112 2008 General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/2000-
2 009/2008/General%20Election/STATEwide%20by%20candidate%20by/o2Ocounty%20gen
%2008.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (percentages are approximate, and vote totals for
third party candidates are not included); 2012 General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, http://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/2010-
2019/2012/2012genresults.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (percentages are approximate,
and vote totals for third party candidates are not included). Id.
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Hillary Clinton was handily defeated in the Democratic primary
in Kentucky's coal country by "outsider" candidate Bernie
Sanders, as shown below.
TABLE 7
2016 Democratic Presidential Primaryl1 3
County [1996 EKY Clinton % Sanders %
Rankl
Pike [11 26% 54%
Martin [2] 31% 57%
Harlan [3] 26% 63%
Perry [41 30% 60%
Leslie [5] 44% 53%
Knott [6] 31% 59%
Floyd [7] 32% 54%
Breathitt [8] 34% 52%
Bell [91 45% 46%
Johnson [101 33% 56%
Hillary Clinton won the state of Kentucky by less than 2,000
votes.114 The razor-thin margin was largely due to her lackluster
vote totals in the Eastern coalfields.115
113 2016 Primary Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/results/2010-
2019/Documents/2016%20primary%20election%20results.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2017)
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In 1996, Kentucky's Congressional delegation had one
Republican senator, Mitch McConnell, and one Democratic
senator, former Governor Wendell Ford.16 The Eastern Kentucky
coal counties have been, at all times relevant, represented by
Republican Representative Hal Rogers.117 When Senator
McConnell ran for reelection in 1996, facing future two-term
Governor Steven Beshear, he won the state by a total of 55
percent to 43 percent.1 18 Senator McConnell lost, however, in six
of the ten largest coal-producing counties in Eastern Kentucky.1 19
TABLE 8
1996 Senate Electionl20
County [EKY McConnell % Beshear % Actual Vote
Rank] Margi for
McConnell
Pike [11 41% 59% - 3,681
Martin [21 63% 37% + 908
Harlan [3] 44% 56% - 998
Perry [41 45% 55% - 885
Leslie [51 69% 31% + 1,389
Knott [61 27% 73% - 2,494
115Id
"1 United States congressional delegations from Kentucky, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 12,
2017),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilUnited States congressional delegations fromKentucky#R
eferences [https://perma.cc/Z9QF-84VF].
117 _[d.
118 1996 Primary and General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/1990-
1999/1996/96Gen-ussenatel.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (Percentages are approximate,





County [EKY McConnell % Beshear % Actual Vote
Margin for
McConnell
Floyd [7] 34% 66% - 4,114
Breathitt [81 32% 68% - 1,570
Bell [91 56% 44% + 892
Johnson [101 60% 40% + 1,363
While Senator McConnell won four out of these ten counties, he
ultimately lost these coal-producing counties by approximately
9,000 votes.121
When Senator McConnell ran for reelection in 2014, a race
that was initially considered to be a competitive race, he defeated
sitting Secretary of State Alison Grimes 56 percent to 41
percent.122 While the statewide margin was within two
percentage points of his victory over Beshear in 1996, Senator
McConnell greatly increased his share of the Eastern Kentucky
coalfield vote.
121 _d
122 2014 General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/2010-
2019/2014/2014%2OGeneral%20Election%20Results.pdf (last viewed Mar. 29, 2017)
(percentages are approximate, and vote totals for third party candidates are not included).
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TABLE 9
2014 Senate Election1 23
County McConnell Grimes % Actual Vote Loss in
% Margin for DEM %
R1nk] EKMcConnell of Vote
from
1996
Pike [11 63% 35% + 5,309 -25%
Martin [21 74% 22% + 2,152 -15%
Harlan [31 72% 25% + 4,252 - 31%
Perry [41 64% 32% + 3,081 -23%
Leslie [51 82% 16% + 2,829 - 15%
Knott [61 59% 38% + 917 -35%
Floyd [71 53% 44% + 1,180 - 22%
Breathitt 52% 44% + 368 - 24%
[81
Bell [91 70% 27% + 3,551 -17%
Johnson 69% 27% + 3,456 -13%
[101
The 2014 election was McConnell's sixth statewide election and
was the first time in his career he had carried Breathitt, Floyd,
12 Compare 2014 General Election Results, supra note 121; with 1996 Primary
and General Election Results, supra note 117 (statistics are from the Kentucky Secretary
of State. Percentages are approximate, third-party candidate percentages not shown).
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Pike and Knott counties.124 After losing these coal counties by a
combined 9,000 votes in 1996, Senator McConnell won the
counties by over 27,000 votes in 2014.
In 1996, the Democratic party controlled both houses of
the Kentucky General Assembly.125 The Democrats held a
twenty-one to seventeen advantage in the Senate, and a
dominant sixty-three to thirty-seven advantage in the House of
Representatives.126 The Republicans took control of the closely-
divided State Senate a few years later,127 but the House would
prove to be more elusive. In 2016, for the first time in nearly 100
years, the Republicans took control of the Kentucky House of
Representatives.128 The race was a landslide victory for the GOP,
who went from being in the minority to having a sixty-four to
thirty-six majority in the House.129 By 2016, the GOP's Senate
majority had increased to a twenty-seven to eleven majority.130
A large portion of the seventeen-seat pickup in the GOP
wave came from Democrats being defeated in House districts
with strong ties to the coal industry.'3 1 As illustrated in Table 10,
Democrats lost races in ten coal-producing districts in Eastern
124 Sam Youngman, McConnell trounces Gnimes, winning sixth term and change
to lead US. Senate, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.kentucky.comlnews/politics-governmentlelection/article44520651.html
[https://perma.cc/JY2L-WGLX]. last viewed
1- 1996 Ky. Acts A-1-A-4.
2 Id.
127 Patrick Crowley, GOP Exults After Taking Senate Rule, Cincinnati Enquirer
(Aug. 24, 1999), http://enquirer.comleditions/1999/08/24/locgop-exults-after.html
[https://perma.ccl5QTG-MQLN].
128 Jack Brammer & Linda Blackford, Republicans take the Kentucky House
ater 95 years of Democratic control, HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 8, 2016),
http://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/articlel13464563.html
[https://perma.cc/5T8B-JE451.
12 House Members, KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE,
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/house/hsemembers.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/A9X9-ZPKQ].
130 Senate Members, KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE,
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/senate/senmembers.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/ZS9M-LT761.
31 2016 General Election Results, KY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://elect.ky.gov/results/2010-
2019/Documents/2016%20General%20Election%20Results.pdf 29-55 (last visited Mar. 29,
2017).
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and Western Kentucky.132 The Democrats unseated in these races
had more than 120 combined years of service in the House of
Representatives.133
TABLE 10
Coa County Losses for Democrats in 2016134
House Coal Counties Years of Service
District
11 Daviess, Henderson 10 years
(*W-KY)
13 Daviess (*WKY) 10 years
14 Daviess, Ohio (*WKY) 14 years
15 Hopkins, Muhlenberg 20 years
(*WKY)
84 Harlan, Perry 8 years
91 Breathitt 2 years
92 Knott, Magoffin, Pike 6 years
95 Floyd, Pike 32 years
97 Morgan, Johnson 26 years
98 Boyd, Greenup Less than 1
One would be hard-pressed to make the case that the
representatives on this list were supporters of the War on Coal,
but their party affiliation was fatal to their reelection hopes
during the Trump wave of 2016. This was, perhaps, the clearest
indication of the political fallout from the War on Coal.
132 See id.
133 See Kentucky state House election results, HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 1, 2016),
http://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-governmentlelection/article111778822.html
[https://perma.ce/8PCT-QF6E].
134 I'm really not sure where/ how to get these numbers. The librarians suggested
multiple local papers covering the elections for a long string cite.
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V. THE FUTURE OF COAL AND EASTERN KENTUCKY
With coal at its lowest point in a century, mining jobs
being extremely scarce, and local government coffers drained of
vital funding, one might say that there is nowhere to go but up
for Eastern Kentucky. If the last ten years have taught anything,
it is that without significant changes, Eastern Kentucky will
remain perched in a precarious position.
The rapid and disastrous downturn for the coal industry
in Eastern Kentucky during the Obama presidency reflects the
dangers inherent in federal environmental policy-making. The
laudable goal of environmental preservation too often obscures
the very real and immediate impact such regulations have on
both industries and individuals. The policies discussed in Section
IV, supra, stripped an already economically-distressed region of
thousands of jobs, and billions of dollars in wages and tax
revenues.
As of the time of this writing, the Trump Administration
has signaled its intention to rollback much of the Obama
regulatory package that damaged the coal industry; specific
proposals are discussed infra. However, it may be too late to undo
much of the damage. During a 2015 interview with Bill Maher,
the then-Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
Gina McCarthy, stated the very real fact that litigation against
the EPA was often a case of too-little-too-late, because even if the
EPA does not win the suit, "most of [the regulated companies] are
already in compliance, investments have been made."1
3 5
Therefore, even the change in administrations, without more
widespread systemic change to federal regulatory authority and
structure, may not be enough to cause significant decision
making changes for the energy sector.
The difficult reality of the situation facing electric utility
operators is shown by the fact that since 2012, at least nine coal-
fired plants in Kentucky have been retired, partially retired,
in Timothy Cama & Lydia Wheeler, Supreme Court overturns landmark EPA
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idled, or converted to natural gas-fueled units.136 Even though
President Trump's agenda seems to significantly improve the
short-term outlook for coal-fired electricity generation, many
decision-makers in the energy sector are nonetheless moving
away from coal. In the heart of the Western Kentucky coalfields,
the Elmer Smith generating station in Owensboro received nearly
one million tons of Kentucky coal in 2015.137 However, after 117
years of burning coal, the utility announced in 2017 that it would
be completely phasing out coal by the year 2023.138 The utility's
two coal-burning units were built in 1964 and 1974, respectively,
and the utility was facing a minimum of $37 million to meet
environmental standards.139 Utilities are faced with mounting
costs to meet current environmental standards and concerns over
environmental standards being heightened in the future.140 Given
this regulatory and economic climate, many decision-makers are
seeing the writing on the wall and choosing to switch to an
alternate energy source instead of upgrading or commissioning
new coal-burning unitS.14 1
The fate of Eastern Kentucky could certainly be shared by
other regions who rely upon fossil fuel extraction or, for that
matter, any other industry that fell out of favor with
environmental regulators. The policies suggested herein,
therefore, apply to any region that has an abundance of fossil
fuels or other natural resources. Because of the wide net cast by
current federal environmental policy, it is important to address
not only what changes can be made to help Eastern Kentucky in
the immediacy, but to address the systemic issues with federal
environmental regulation threatening other regions or industries
in the future.
13 Ky. Coal Facts 16th Ed., supra note 4, at 60; see also Rhonda Miller,
Owensboro to End Coal-Fired Power After 117 Years, WKUFM (Mar. 20, 2017),
http://wkyufm.org/post/owensboro-end-coal-fired-power-after-117-years#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/G9ZQ-JEJ6]; see also ACCCE, supra note 64.
13 Ky. Coal Facts 16th Ed., supra note 4, at 54.







Over the last century, Eastern Kentucky coal has created
untold wealth and prosperity. As documented in Section III,
supra, too much of this wealth and prosperity has permanently
left the region. The author posits that a rollback of the unduly
onerous Obama-Era regulations will have a yet-to-be-determine
positive short-term impact on the local economy, but that without
further action, such repeals will be no more than a temporary
salve for a severe problem.
The early days of the Trump Administration have given
many in Eastern Kentucky hope that better days are ahead for
the coal industry. While there is cause for optimism, the election
of a President who has professed to be a "friend of coal" will not
eliminate all difficulties facing the region. There are challenges
posed from the increased use of natural gas, cheap coal from
Wyoming, and the decreasing number of readily-accessible and
economically viable coal seams in Eastern Kentucky.142 The
"green movement" and the desire of its adherents to increase the
use of renewable energy is a major policy threat to Eastern
Kentucky. Moreover, should there be a breakthrough in
affordable and consistent renewable energy, coal will be an
immediate casualty.
Regional leadership must be able to effectively prepare a
long-term plan that recognizes both the free market and
regulatory challenges likely to face the coal industry in the
future. These challenges are shared by other areas that draw
economic benefit from natural resource extraction. Policymakers
at the national, state and local levels should have four main goals
when considering environmental and energy policy going forward:
(1) avoiding undue interference in the free market by cutting
back onerous regulations; (2) retaining and attracting capital in
regions that extract natural resources; (3) diversification of local
economies and workforces; and, (4) responsible land use and
planning.
The easiest step to take is the rollback of the crippling
changes made during the Obama administration. Republican-
142 Ky. Coal Facts 16th Ed., supra note 4, at 38; (estimating that there are still
7.4 billion tons of coal in Eastern Kentucky in seams that are greater than twenty-eight
inches, the current standard to be considered minable).
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controlled Washington is beginning to do just that. In February
2017, the House and Senate used the Congressional Review Act
to overrule the "Stream Protection Act." 143 On February 28, 2017,
President Trump signed an Executive Order that seeks to reverse
the Obama Administration's "Waters of the United States"
rule.144 On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed an executive
order requiring the EPA to reverse course on the Clean Power
Plan.145
Statutory changes are necessary to prevent the sort of
damage that occurred during the Obama Administration from
being repeated in the future. One such change would be an
aggressive implementation of the Regulations from the Executive
in Need of Scrutiny Act, which would require Congress to approve
any regulations with more than $100 million in costs.146 Congress
should also assure that agencies are required to zealously
examine and consider costs when promulgating regulations, in
order to avoid the absurd results reached by the EPA in
connection with the MATS Rule.147 Another, and more drastic
approach, would be to utilize the Article V convention process set
forth in the United States Constitution to propose constitutional
amendments to limit federal administrative or regulatory
power.14
Efforts must be made to diversify local economies and
train the local workforce in areas other than coal mining.
According to the Kentucky State Data Center, the Eastern
Kentucky coalfield counties are projected to continue to steadily
'3 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement,
Stream Protection Rule, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR (last modified Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.osmre.gov/programs/rcm/streamprotectionrule.shtm [https://perma.cc/3HUJ-
45PT].
' Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
'4 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
146 H. Sterling Burnett, Slowing the Regulatory Onslaught, Washington Times
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/24/reins-act-will-slow-
the-regulatory-onslaught [https://perma.cc/4X8H-BWXB].
14 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2,699, 2,705 (2015).
148 See generally John Malcolm, Consideration of a Convention to Propose




lose population in coming years.149 Anecdotally speaking, from
the author's personal experience as a bankruptcy practitioner in
Pike County, many of those who are leaving the region are
younger families who were once employed in the mines or support
industries, or other young people who are unable to find work in
the region. Many of these families are relocating to Central
Kentucky or Louisville where there are more opportunities in the
manufacturing sector. Projects such as the Shaping Our
Appalachian Region initiative have shown promise in creating an
economic vision for the coalfields, one that will hopefully help
retain and attract young working families to the region.150
It is also pivotal that coal severance money be retained in
coal counties and effectively managed to maximize the goals of
growing and diversifying the Eastern Kentucky economy. Federal
efforts such as the Revitalizing the Economy of Coal
Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More
Act promoted by Congressman Rogers and Senator McConnell
may hold promise as well.151 Finally, though this article has
sought to point out the inherent problems with Obama-era
federal regulation, the preservation of natural resources is a
highly worthy goal. The hills of Eastern Kentucky are a unique
and beautiful area, and it is vital that the landscape is protected
from wanton and undue destruction. However, federal and state
regulatory environmental policy must be balanced with the need
for affordable and reliable energy, and the importance of the coal
industry for the economic stability of the people of Eastern
Kentucky.
19 See Matt Ruther, Tom Sawyer, & Sarah Ehresman, Projections of
Populations and Households: State of Kentucky, Kentucky Counties and Area
Development Districts 2015-2040, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE (2016),
http://www.ksdc.louisville.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/projection-report-v16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZLL5-P4YY.
150 See generally Blueprint for Economic Growth, SOAR, http://www.soar-
ky.org/blueprint (last visited Mar. 23, 2017) [https://perma.ccJFC5G-VYAX].
15! Bill Estep, McConnell Signs on As Sponsor of $1 Billion Proposal to Help Coal
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VI. CONCLUSION
The "War on Coal" fought during the Obama presidency
had a devastating impact on an economically vulnerable region.
The failure of federal regulators to adequately consider the
economic destruction being wrought upon the coal industry and
the inhabitants of the region should serve as a stark warning to
all, and result in meaningful changes to prevent its future
recurrence.
